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ABSTRACT 
THEMATIZATION OF DEATHIN PHILOSOPHY AND ART 
Özge Ejder 
M.F .A. in Graphical Arts 
Supervisor: Assist.Prof. Lewis Keir Johnson 
June,2000 
This study takes the theme of death in philosophy and art as its 
explidt focus, cancentrating mainly of contemporary French philosopher 
Maurice Blanchot's literary and philosophical texts. The 'aporias' in the 
discourses of death are examined through an aporetic experience of the 
concepts, possible- impossible, absence-presence, finite, infinite involving 
in a discussion canceming the concepts of tirnit and representation. 
Keywords: Death, aporia, impossible, image, experience 
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ÖZET 
SANATTA VE FELSEFEDE ÖLÜM TEMASI 
Özge Ejder 
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü 
Yüksek Lisans 
Tez yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Lewis Keir Johnson 
Haziran, 2000 
Bu çahşma, merkezine çağdaş Fransız filozofu Maurice Blanchot'nun 
edebi ve felsefi metinlerini alarak sanat ve felsefi söylemlerde ölüm 
temas1mn izini sürmeyi amaçlam1şt1r. 'Ölüm' le ilgili söylemlerde öne çıkan 
'aporia' lar ; olanakh- olanaks1z, Var olan- olmayan, sonlu, sonsuz 
kavramlannın 'aporetik' deneyimi çerçevesinde, tirnit ve yeniden- sunum 
kavramlan tartış1larak ortaya konmaya çahşllm1şt1r. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ölüm, aporia, olanaks1z, imge, deneyim 
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Introduction 
This study takes death as its explicit focus, yet the aporias that 
discourses on death are constructed around has also become the main 
concern. The theme of death in art and philosophy is scrutinized through a 
reading mainly of French contemporary philosopher Maurice Blanchot but 
not restricted as such. Death, finitude and negativity are the concepts 
which are traced as any philosophy provides the ground of a discussion 
which produces art in the movement of aporia. 
Scope, Objective and Ethics 
The first chapter with its structure and the way of holding the issues 
in question, has become more different than others and risked to have 
been read as irrelevant to the overall subject. The importance of this 
chapter would be that only such a beginning can provide a threshold to 
understanding the notions of contemporary philosophy in general. The first 
chapter is a reading of Blanchot, having in mind his questioning of some 
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concepts he was influenced by -especially from the works of Hegel and 
Nietzsche- in his book The lnfinite Conversation. This book ought to be 
distinguished from his other books on account of its stylistic variety as it 
includes not only essays but also a certain criticism of Platonic dialogues 
by mimicking them without being attracted by the dialectical unity they 
suggest. If The Space of Literature attempts to overthrow Platonism by 
suggesting a resemblance theory which demarginalizes the simulacrum 
together with other philosophies of difference, The lnfinite Conversation, 
does this -overthrow Platonism - by questioning the dialectics. 
Dialectics, antology and the critique of antology 
have the same postulate: all three deliver themselves over 
to the One... 'the most profound question' is the question 
that escapes reterence to the One? lt is the other question, 
the question of the Other, but also that is always other. 
(Blanchot, 1993: 440) 
Blanchot's 'the most profound question' has its roots in the question 
of being that dies away and this question has to take the Other as 
problematic and has to escape all the confusions canceming the 
problematic, such as attempts at making death possible. The philosophies 
of Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger are considered to belong to that 
attitude- making death possible-. The first two of these philosophies will 
be questioned from the point of view of Blanchot in the first chapter. 
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What Blanchot finds in the philosophy of Nietzsche is the self 
contradictions that constructs the essential mavement and goes along with 
Blanchot's double affirmation at the expense of the thought of Eternal 
Return. The influence of Nietzsche determines not only Blanchot's but the 
whole contemporary philosophy's shift from rationalism to irrationalism. lt 
is Nietzsche who defined to a large extent many of the key concepts of the 
discussion of contemporary philosophy in which together with Blanchot, 
Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault have participated. 
But on Heidegger's account, together with other reasons, Jacques 
Derrida's question "ls my death possible" (1993: 21) opens up the horizon as 
he suggest an aporetic experience mentioning the aporias involved in 
Heideggerian philosophy in terms of the concept of death- at least from 
the point of view of the debates on the possibility of death. If the first 
chapter can be understood as a certain kind of reading of The lnfinite 
Conversation, the second chapter then can be taken as a reading of 
Derrida who says that all his writing is on death, focusing on his book 
Aporias. 
Heidegger's texts play the central role in Aporias but in the early 
pages of the book before explicitly invoking Heidegger, Derrida writes; 
"concerning the threshold of death, we are engaged here toward a certain 
possibility of the impossible (1993: 11 ). This 'possibility of the impossible · 
is paraphrased from Heidegger's Being and Time in which it is repeated 
3 ' .-... • ;, ~ ~:131'cy 
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several times as a phenomenological definition of death. But Heidegger's 
suggestion that, Dasein is its possibilities as possibilities, - living through 
possibilities rather than grasping them theoretically- characterizes Dasein 
as a being-possible and signifies the attempt that Blanchot escapes. 
Heidegger and Derrida share the same subject of cancem in terms of 
'impossible' as deconstruction is defined by Derrida as a certain aporetic 
experience of the impossible. The parallelism between Derrida's definition 
of deconstruction and Heidegger's phenomenological definition of death 
may well lead us to the view that Derrida substitutes Heidegger's 
possibility with his aporetic experience. Questioning the possibility of 
death then necessitates an aporetic experience. 
Despite the different implications of two philosophies, suggesting a 
parallelism between Derrida's 'aporetic experience' and Blanchot's 'limit 
experience' seems plausible as they are both involved in a question of 
being, experience and limit. Just like Blanchot's 'the most profound 
question', Derrida's understanding of aporetic experience refers to an other 
question, the question of the Other and perhaps any criticism toward 
Heidegger should approach Dasein from the privileged position of its own 
death. 
'The death of the other - or for the other- that which institutes our 
self and our responsibility, would correspond to a mo re originary 
experience" says Derrida in his book The Gift of Death (1995: 4). 
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The possibility in Heidegger's discourse does not correspond to the 
experience of the instant of death and thus is not ruined by the logical 
possibility that death is the end of experience. Derrida on the other hand 
accentuates on my death's impossibility that if death turns out to entail 
the end of experience and 1 cannot even experience this end of experience 
then my death does not happen to me. "Here dying would be the aporia, 
the impossibility of being dead, the impossibility of living or rather 
'existing' one's death" (Derrida, 1993: 73). This echoes a very Epicurian 
theme as it suggests the impossibility of a co-temporality of death and 
presence. According to Derrida thisisa disaster- in the sense of Blanchot-
that 1 cannot die. 1 never meet my death. 
The third chapter aims to discuss the problem of representation 
grounded on absence of the object of reference, departing from Blanchot's 
definition of image as "what is given us by a contact at a distance" (1982: 
32) and his resemblance theory. According to Blanchot the corpse and the 
image sh are the quality of 'strangeness'. The corpse is neither the same as 
the one who was alive, nor sameone or something else. The cadaverous 
presence both belongs to the world of the living and the world of the dead. 
lt occupies two spaces, the here and nowhere. From here Blanchot 
suggests the double character of the image. In terms of the corpse the 
strangeness is that it has no specific point of reterence as it resembles 
nothing but itself. Hence it signifies nothing and brings forth a possibility 
for the image to exist as a double resembling to itself. And behind this 
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resemblance lies the ungraspable, inaccessable, uncontrolable idea of 
death that which suggests an undecidability in terms of the place of 
death. Where it belongs and the impossibility for it to establish a relation 
to the world. Then, what is the image when it is no langer an image of 
something? 
In the account of death and representation Elizabeth Bronfen's book 
Over Her Death Body provides a clear path which traces the theory of 
representation through a reading of literary history, art criticism and 
psychoanalysis. The aporia of representation for instance according to 
Bronfen; "seems to be that the part of putting the real under erasure 
means articulating it, enacting that is not only how representations falter 
and stumble before the real but how the real must also fail before 
representation'"(1992: 53). 
To read Blanchot- with Hegel, with Nietzsche or Heidegger- actually 
does not say so much as is consistent with his remarks on 'oeuvre'; a failure 
is inevitable as this failure opens the space of literature. On the other 
hand the experience Blanchot suggests through concepts he inherits from 
these thinkers is necessary though the concepts themselves lead nowhere 
they nevertheless maintain the thinking of negativity, finitude, death and 
Etemal Return in Blanchot's thinking. 
'Blanchot' is the name of an infini te dispersion: 
language itself as a pure potentia, or as the emptiness or 
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pure exteriority that is not a 'beyond' but instead an 
eternal return to a never- having- been or an extreme 
youth (W all, 1999: 6 ). 
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Chapter 1 : Sources of Blanchot's Philosophy 
The debates about death provides a unique point from the birth of 
philosophy throughout Western metaphysics and finally leads me to 
theoretical and esthetic discourses of critical theory. Death is as 
Schopenhauer puts it · the muse of philosophy' and 1 will try to enlarge on 
this daim, that it is also the 'muse of art'. Death, finitude and negativity 
are the issues which seem to construct the ground of a universal which 
produces art in the movement of aporia. 
'The dedsion to be without being is possibility itself; the possibility 
of death" (Blanchot, 1982: 96). Blanchot mentions three systems of thought 
that challenges him with their attitude towards this dedsion. He claims 
that Hegel's, Nietzsche's and Heidegger's systems of thought attempt to 
account for this decision and can be taken as attempts at making death 
possible. 
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1.1 Hegel 
Before making a reading of Blanchot through his aporetic concepts 
we need to look at his path which passes from these three thinkers as he 
owes much to them. Reference to German philosophy especially to Hegel 
and Heidegger is quite clear in most of Blanchot's works. In terms of Hegel 
he shares the same path with Georges Bataille. Their intellectual affinity 
has its roots in the attraction to certain concepts contained in the 
philosophy of Hegel. The most important of these are death and 
negativity. Ann Smock in the introduction to her translation of The Space 
of Literature claims that; 
With Hegel, Blanchot recognizes negativity as the 
maving force of the dialectic. lt is the power that informs 
history; it is death, creative and masterful, at work in the 
world. lndeed Blanchot hails the impending completion of 
this labor which is the realization of human possibilities, 
the unfolding of truth. (1982: 6) 
What Blanchot finds in Hegelian philosophy is the idea that 
objective reality and human existence are Nothingness. This Nothingness 
makes possible the negative and creative action. Therefore he puts death, 
man's negativity which is essentially voluntary as the principle of action. 
The man who negates nature gains his own possibility of action in this 
negativity which is not necessarily given in consciousness. Bataille in his 
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article "Hegel, Death and Sacrifice" claims that in consciousness that which 
exists in itself appears but only to disappear, 
... this negation is exteriorized, really (in itself) 
changes the reality of Nature. Man works and fights; he 
transforms the given; he transforms Nature and in 
destroying it he creates a world, a world which was not. 
(Bataille: 1 O) 
Blanchot's critical approach to Hegel's assimilation of death to 
negation, and his understanding of death as the limit within which we all 
strive, the ultimate horizon which is the source of our activity, mastery 
and accomplishments, leads him to a reappraisal of death and negativity. 
Together with Bataille, Blanchot's attitude is the rejection of a notian of 
death which is reduced to a constructive negativity. Bataille says in a 
letter to Kojeve that; "If action ('doing') is -as Hegel says- negativity, the 
question then becomes one of knowing if the negativity of sameone who 
has 'nothing more to do' disappears or subsists in a state of 'unemployable 
negativity'; personally, 1 can settle this question in one way only, being 
myself exactly this 'unemployable negativity' (1 could not define myself any 
more precisely)" (Gregg: 11 ). Blanchot suggests that the essence of death 
is to be found in its incompletion and this character of death is ignored in 
Hegel as he insists on seeing death as an instrument of negativity. 
Death- if we wish so to name that unreality- is the 
most terrible thing there is and to uphold the work of 
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death is the task which demands the greatest strenght. 
lmpotent beauty hates this awareness, because 
understanding makes this demand of beauty, a requirement 
which beauty cannot fulfill. Now the life of Spirit is not 
that life which is frightened of death, and spares itself 
destruction, but that life which assumes death and lives 
with it. Spirit attains its truth only by finding itself in 
absolute dismemberment. lt is not that (prodigious) power 
by being the Positive that turns away from the Negative, as 
when we say of something; this is nothing or (this is) false 
and having (thus) disposed of it, pass from there to 
something else; no, Spirit is that power only to the degree 
in which it contemplates the Negative face to face (and) 
dwells with it. This prolonged sojourn is the magical force 
which transposes the negative into given-Being. 
(Bataille:14) 
The magical force of Hegel's exposes Man to his own Negativity. 
Bataille would call it a struggle of Man against Nature where Man 
constitutes himself as 'Subject'. This is the point Blanchot and Bataille see 
as problematic. 
This 'subject' is powerless to do anything else except to await his 
own death's approach. But it is not just that passivity towards death that 
creates anguish. There is always something incomplete whenever dying is 
at work. The impossibility to grasp death in i ts entirety '· the fear of this 
impossibility to die completely create anguish. We have all the fears of 
martals and desires of immortals,s as Cicero correctly states. Being mortat 
we necessarily possess the idea of death as a possibility and by dying we 
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lose the power of a certain kind of negative as it appears as an 
impossibility. Hegel's way of overcoming this dual status of death is by 
means of his famous concept of 'Aufhebung' which suggests an act of 
transgression in which what is transgressed is at the same time preserved . 
For Hegel, dialectics is a process of 'Aufhebung' which literally means 
"lifting up". But the problem here for Blanchot is that this word also 
suggests a double meaning of conservation and negation. lnstead of 
'Aufhebung', Blanchot prefers Bataille's abstract theory of transgression. 
Bataille converges constructive negativity, excess negativity and 
transgression under his discussions of sacrifice. Sacrifice for Bataille is a 
transgressive act as it is the breaking of the rule permitted by the rule. 
This is a permission to violate the established limits- which are also 
supposed to be respected-, under certain drcumstances. He claims that 
these interdictions are there to be violated. Michel Foucault in his article 
"A Preface to Transgression" defines transgression as; 
Transgression is an action which involves the limit, 
that narrow zone of a line where it displays the flash of its 
passage, but perhaps also its entire trajectory, even its 
origin; it is likely that transgression has its entire space in 
the line it crosses. The play of limits and transgression 
seems to be regulated by a simple obstinacy: transgression 
incessantly crosses and recrosses a line which closes up 
behind it in a wave of extremely short duration, and thus it 
is made to return once more right to the horizon of the 
uncrossable. (1998: 27) 
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Jacques Derrida in his essay "From Restricted to General Economy: A 
Hegelianism without Reserve" questions whether transgression overcomes 
the problematic of suppresion and reserve in Hegelian 'Aufhebung', still 
remaining in the domain of restricted economy. John Gregg in his book 
Maurice Blanchot and the Literature of Transgression clearly states that 
despite the certain disregard for the rule -in order to maintain the 
functioning of the restricted economy- there is always the tolerations of 
the infractions as they stimulate and and revive this economy. "No 
transgression is ever complete; the law always survives the infraction 
because the tatter is in the service of the former" (Gregg: 13). To put it in 
Bataille's words; a conservative wisdom orders and limits it. Bataille's 
criticism of Hegel points to negativity. Destruction, suppression, death and 
sacrifice loses their negativity in the system as they constitute an 
expenditure and a negativity without reserve. Negativity enters the 
process of production and representation of meaning for the sake of 
positivity; that is to say, in Derrida's words, "aufhebung turns negativity 
into an investment by amortizing absolute expenditure" (1978: 257). By not 
taking the negative seriously Hegel loses the grounds for a negativity as a 
resource. Bataille comes to such a point when he neglects the 
transgression of transgression which is necessary for Derrida. Bataille's 
transgression is always in the service of other systems and cannot become 
a dominant law itself. 
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Blanchot's reading of Hegel in his book The lnfinite Conversation 
suggests an awaiting the Hegelian dialectic for continuity and this 
continuity is defined as one engendering itself, maving from the center to 
the periphery, from the abstract to the concrete. A continuity which is 
other than the continuity of a synchronic whole as it adds itself the 
parameter of duration and history. By doing so it constitutes itself as a 
totality that is finite and unlimited, and moves according to the circular 
demand. The features of such a continuity are the principle of 
understanding and the principle of negation. Blanchot claims that this 
principle of understanding is satisfied only by identitiy through repetition. 
While the principle of reason requires an overcoming through negation, the 
speech of dialectics on the other hand seeks to include the moment of 
discontinuity by maving from one term to its opposite. From Being to 
Nothingness. Blanchot finds between these opposites a nothingness more 
essential than Nothingness itself "-the void of an interval that continually 
hollows out and in hallawing itself out becomes distended: the nothing as 
work and movement" (1993: 7). Blanchot says that the third term of 
dialectics fills this void. The synthesis close the interval by maintaining it. 
And by maintaining it, accomplishes it, "realizes in its very lack, and thus 
makes of this lack a capacity, anather possibility" (Blanchot, 1993: 7). 
The system of thought critized by Blanchot as being an attempt at 
making death possible is this. This is man's encounter with himself in the 
certainity of his mortality. Blanchot says that man considers this condition 
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in terms of making his death possible. "lt doesn't suffice for him that he is 
mortal; he understands that he has to become mortal, that he must be 
mortal twice over: sovereignly, extremely mortal." (Blanchot, 1982: 96) 
Making his own death man attributes himself the status of a maker who has 
the power of giving meaning and truth to his Being. 'The decision to be 
without being is possibility itself' (Blanchot, 1982: 96 ). 
To transgress on the other hand is to lose that as negativity. This 
means to lose that power of mastery over death. That is to say encounter 
it as an impossibility. 
The T will never arrive at it, nor will the individual, 
this particle of dust that 1 am, nor even the self of all of us 
that is supposed to represent absolute self-consciousness. 
Only the ignorance that 1-who-dies would incarnate by 
acceding to that space where in dying it never dies in the 
first person as anT will reach it. (Blanchot, 1993: 209-210) 
Blanchot interprets Hegelian attitude towards death- making it 
possible- in relation with the cultural attitude towards death. For Blanchot 
"the task of culture has always been to restore a kind of purity to death, to 
make it authentic, personal, proper-but also to make it possible" (1993: 
180). Blanchot replaces himself on the opposite side and holds an 
anticultural attitude; departing from Bataille's 'unemployable negativity' 
he insists on the inauthentic, impersonal, and impossible characteristics of 
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death. Blanchot sees the possibility of such death in art which embodies 
the dual status of death. 
This possibility for art is revealed most evidently in literature for 
Blanchot. His way of dealing with this dual status of death passes from his 
principle of 'contestation' which suggests the possibility of non-positive 
affirmation. Michel Foucault in his essay "A Preface to Transgression" 
defines 'contestation' as an act that does not imply a generalized negation 
but as an affirmation that affirms nothing. 
Rather than being a process of thought for denying 
existences or values, centestation is the act which carries 
them all to their limits, and from there, to the limit where 
an ontological decision achieves its end; to cantest is to 
proceed until one reaches the empty core where being 
achieves its tirnit and where the tirnit defines being. (1998: 
29) 
There is a denial of the possibility of transforming the negativity 
into action in contestation. Blanchot rejects the idea that man exhaust his 
negativity in action, transforms all the nothingness that he is into power. 
Perhaps he can reach the absolute by making himself 
equal to the whole and by becoming conscious of the 
whole. But then more extreme than this absolute is the 
passian of negative thought; for faced with this response, 
negative thought is still capable of introducing the question 
that suspends it, and, faced with the accomplishment of 
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the whole, still capable of maintaining the other exigency 
that again raises the issue of the infinite in the form of 
contestation. (Blanchot, 1993: 205) 
Blanchot points towards the necessity of a limit experience in order 
not to stop or get lost in the circularity of the whole. Given that we'll all 
die we admit that sovereignty has passed to death. Blanchot sees the only 
possible way of gaining man's true sovereignty in affirmation. Affirming 
himself he is not only himself, not only nature but also that which is not 
nature. 
The limit experience is the experience of what is 
outside the whole when the whole excludes every outside; 
the experience of what is still to be attained when all is 
attained and what is still to be known when all is known: 
the inaccessible, the unknown itself. (Blanchot, 1993: 205) 
For Blanchot, the experience of the inaccessible, the unknown 
cannot be distinguished from Bataille's notian of inner experience. Radical 
negation is affirmed in inner experience. Blanchot claims that there is a 
risk of substantializing nothingness in this affirmation. In this respect, the 
limit experience is still more extreme than inner experience. Limit 
experience gives us the possibility of (a) new origin(s) which offers to 
thought an affirmation. This affirmation does not affirm itself rather it is 
the possibility of affirmation. For Blanchot, this experience only comes 
from the edge of the limit when the limits unveil. This is what Blanchot 
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ca lls the 'ultima te exigency'. Blanchot daim s that this is an endless process 
that never offers itself as completed. 
Blanchot's notian of double affirmation cannot be thought as a way 
for general truth which defines the elements in discourses. In fact, what 
Blanchot aims in his discourse is the plurality of speech with the second 
affirmation. The heterogeneity is acquired in this form of experience 
which shows more than one ground for the play of thought. By erasing 
(the) grounds in discourses, Blanchot constructs the play of difference 
between two persons, a dialogue which makes plurality of speech possible. 
The process of affirmation in Bataille's work links meaning to itself in order 
to generate meaning. In this respect, Blachot constructs a new way of 
affirmation which affirms nothing and only affirms affirmation. Therefore, 
the double affirmation in Blanchot escapes from the discourse that makes 
man independent from other beings, so the negation put at stake is always 
for the sake of difference which is the possibility of man's freedom. 
Blanchot searches the basis for the infinite affirmation of thought rather 
than the transgression of limits in which transgression is always linked to 
meaning and itself. Blanchot always places the impossible experience at 
the heart of his discourse, because the infinite affirmation of thought can 
only be grasped when it escapes from us. 
Blanchot's approach to art can be understood by following his path 
that suggests limit-experience. The artwork is not an object for Blanchot. 
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"lt is as if a seeret law required of the work that it always be concealed in 
what it shows and that it only shows what must remain concealed and that 
finally it only shows what must stay hidden by concealing it" (Blanchot, 
1982: 232-233). 
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1. 2 Nietzsche 
Blanchot suggests that the essential mavement in Nietzsche's 
thought consists in self-contradiction. This is to say that each time it 
affirms, the affirmation must be put in relation with the one opposing it. 
Blanchot characterizes this as an act of search for the true in the depths. 
The way which leads to truth should pass from contradiction. This act of 
search necessarily turns around itself. This is ignoring the idea of center, 
origin and suggests a non-originary origin. 
Nietzsche's influence in Blanchot's works is evident especially in his 
later writings. His article written in 1958 Nietzsche, today forms the first 
part of the sixth chapter of The lnfinite Conversation, 'Reflections on 
nihilism' , which can also be read historically as the attempt of the writer's 
canfronting his own political experience. But the main concern shared by 
these two thinkers can also be traced in these chapters which is 
Nietzsche's denial of the privileged status of truth, or the idea that truth is 
the product of error. John Gregg, in his previously mentioned book 
suggests that Blanchot insists on the limited, restricted nature of truths 
produced by such errors. Nietzsche rejects the fundementat doctrines of 
epistemology, the correspondence theory of truth and the referential 
theory of meaning. That is to say there is no conformity of mind with 
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object and following this supposition, no adequate relation with the world 
through language. 
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, 
metonymies, and anthropomorphisms- in short, a sum of 
human relations which have been poetically and 
rhetorically intensified, transferred and embellished, and 
which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, 
canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have 
forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have 
become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, 
coins which have lost their embossing and are now 
considered as metal and no longer coins. (Nietzsche, 
Philosophy and Truth, 84) 
Nietzsche questions the grounds of both truth and language. For 
Nietzsche according to Gregg, philosophy forgets the metaphorical origins 
that lie hidden deep within concepts. "Concepts are actually congealed 
metaphors, and the error of philosophy resides in its blindness to the fact 
that concepts succeed in passing themselves off as something they are not" 
(Gregg: 175). 
Nietzsche sees knowledge as nothing but working with metaphors. 
Blanchot gives priority to poetry over everyday language, the way 
Nietzsche does to metaphor over concept. 'Transitive language 
subordinated to the logic of means and ends arrests the murmur of 
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contestation at the origin of Language just as metaphors soLidify to become 
concepts" (Gregg: 176). 
Nietzsche's influence cannot be Limited with his criticaL approach to 
epistemoLogy. BLanchot aLso borrows Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal 
return which suggests that there is simpLy no present to be constituted. 
The present is a tirnit that is effaced, and therefore not present as it is 
always crossed too late or too soon. This is the canception of the non-
present temporality of the present. 
What Nietzsche suggests is the reversal of time in order for man not 
to be limited in his temporal dimension. The will that wills nothingness is 
the will that wills eternity. This is a typical Nietzschean act w hi ch turn s 
into itself and 'will' loses its meaning or maybe we should say becomes the 
will to will. 
Having thus recovered the idea of eternity, and the 
idea of 'being', love of the eternal and knowledge of the 
depths of 'being', ... we are at the heart of nihilism. 
(BLanchot, 1993: 149) 
Blanchot says that the philosophy of Nietzsche "takes its distance 
from dialectkal philosophy less in cantesting it than in repeating it, that 
is, in repeating the principle concepts or moments that it deflects" (1993: 
159). These concepts are the idea of contradiction, the idea of going 
beyond, the idea of transvaluation, the idea of totality and especially the 
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idea of circularity that suggests the circularity of truth and affirmation 
together with all the other concepts mentioned. 
The idea of going beyond-whether understood in a Hegelian or a 
Nietzschean sense, a creation that does not preserve but destroys- seems 
sufficient for Nietzsche. If nihilism as Nietzsche himself states, is that the 
highest values devaluated themselves and if these values are for example 
the ideal, consciousness, reason or culture, then man has the power to 
destroy these values by creating their meaning. That is to say man has the 
power to create his own world and attribute a meaning to it. This seems as 
a suggestion that ignores the limits to man's activity. Everything is 
permitted because above all knowing everything is permitted. Nietzsche 
says; 
We have a still undiscovered country before us, the 
boundaries of which no one has seen, a beyand to all 
countries and comers of the ideal known hitherto, a world 
so over-rich in the beautiful, the strange, the 
unquestionable, the frightful. (Nietzsche quoted in 
Blanchot, 1993: 145) 
Blanchot nonetheless points to some possible misunderstandings of 
Nietzsche. His attempt can still be seen asa constitution of a system as he 
first introduces the death of God and then as the consequence of this, 
nihilism is suggested and finally and not suprisingly as the consequence of 
nihilism Nietzsche affirms the Eternalreturn and its overturning. Blanchot's 
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own questioning of Nietzsche must be traced through his own words as he 
says; 
But does affirming the return mean to come around, 
to circulate, to make of the circle an accomplished 
soverignty? Clearly not. If only because the eternity of the 
return- the infinite of the return- does not permit assigning 
to the figure a center, even less an infinity of centers, just 
as the infinite of the repetition cannot be totalized in 
order to produce the unity of a figure strictly delimited and 
whose construction would escape the law it figures forth. If 
the Eternal Return can affirm itself, it affirms neither the 
return nor the primacy of the One, nor the Whole, and not 
even by way of the necessity that through the Etemal 
Return 'everything retums', for the circle and the circle of 
all circles do not give it a figure any more than the Whole 
can encompass the Etemal Return, or coincide with it. 
Even if 'everything retums', it is not the whole that 
retums, but rather: it returns, the retum retums (as 
neutral). (1993: 275) 
Blanchot's understanding of art as influenced heavily from 
Nietzsche's etemal recurrence particularly manifests itself in Friendship: 
Blanchot suggests "Just as the world of art is tied to absence, so the time 
of art is related to etemal repetition" (33). Art must realize the possibility 
of detaching itself from the truth of the world by intertwining with 
absence. 
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Chapter 2: Death and Experience 
2. 1 Aporetic Experience 
Rudolphe Gasche in his book The Tain of the Mirror, explicates the 
importance of aporias as a philosophical method both in terms of 
Heidegger and Derrida. He claims it to be a philosophical method which 
has consisted in starting off from difficulties and conflicting arguments 
that seem to offer no way out. But he mentions a dialectical process, until 
a way out (euporia) is found, a process passes from the hopelessness of 
aporetic situations. (Gasche: 86) In Derrida's case, it becomes hard to talk 
about a dialectics which aims to find that way out of hopeless situations, 
rather, as Gasche claims; we face a kind of emphasis on the philosophical 
path that leads from aporias to their harmonious unity. 
The term aporias is chosen in order to suggest a way of 
understanding Blanchot's philosophy which insistingly constructs arguments 
by using -to put it in Derrida's words -'nondialectizable contradictions'. 
Blanchot's attitudes towards art in general, passes through his canception 
of death -as they share the same destiny of incompletion-, which excludes 
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any attempts at making death possible. One of the most significant 
attempt comes from Heidegger and Derrida's reading of 'Being and Time'-
concentrating mostly on the chapters canceming Dasein's possibility of 
Being-a-whole and Being-towards-death - may present itself as a model of 
an overcoming such an attitude by generating an aporetic experience. 
Discourses on death put into question many concepts; such as 
possibility, impossibility, finitude, infinity and limit. These concepts will 
hopefully gain importance in Blanchot's texts in the light of Derrida's 
concem with these concepts in his aporetic experience, he also defines 
deconstruction asa certain aporetic experience of the impossible. 
The difficulty of the subject lies in its relation with the concept of 
truth as it suggests the concept of 'li mit' and a 'beyond'. Derrida's quotation 
from Diderot is crudal; "letting oneself be carried beyond the limits of 
truth" (Derrida, 1993: 1 ). That quotation reminds us of Blanchot's claims 
about the limited, restricted nature of truths produced by errors. If truth 
as Derrida continues his discussion, suggests a certain relation to what 
terminates or determines it, what has to be questioned is not truth but 
what produces it. If there is a kind of error, it belongs to our 
understanding of li mit or border. 
The difference between 'border' and 'limit' can be explained as such; 
border is what one produces in order to construct discourses on death or 
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on something else. The point is that it is put and this gives us a possibility 
to deny our conditions as mortals, 
... the absolute imminence of death at every instant. 
This imminence of a disappearance that is by essence 
premature seals the union of the possible and the 
impossible, of fear and desire, and of mortality and 
immortality, in being to death. (Derrida, 1993: 4) 
'Border' brings the impossibility of referring to a 'beyond'. Derrida 
says that any statement be it negative, affirmative or interrogative share 
the same difficulty. But in terms of li mit we encounter anather difficulty 
as this word suggests an experience of it. What Derrida calls aporetic 
experience is the experience of a nonpassage, an impasse which no tonger 
ignores the fact that there is no limit. Death for Blanchot is only a 
metaphor to be used in representing the idea of limit which is at the same 
time excluded by the limit. My intention is to daim that Blanchot's limit-
experience has the same goals of Derrida's aporetic experience. There is a 
parallelism between the experience of the aporia which has the possibility 
of an affirmation put in a negative form despite its impossibility and 
impracticability and 'limit- experience' of Blanchot's which suggests a 
mavement of contestation and a passian of negative thought. To put it in 
Blanchot's words; 
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The limit-experience is experience itself; thought 
thinking that which will not let itself be thought; thought 
thinking more than it is able by an affirmation that affirms 
more than can be affirmed.This more itself is the 
experience: affirming only by an excess of affirmation and 
in this surplus, affirming without anything being affirmed-
finally affirming nothing. (1993: 209) 
The word "aporia" is important for Derrida as it suggests more than 
the word "problem". To see these concepts as problematic necessitates 
their being seen asa projectian or protection. Derrida says that, 
... problema can signify projectfon or protection, that 
which one poses or throws in front of oneself, either as the 
projectian of a project, of a task to accomplish, or as the 
protection created by a substitute, a presthesis that we put 
forthin order to represent, replace, shelter, or dissimulate 
ourselves. (1993: 11) 
That is to say that there is a certain kind of determination in terms 
of problem. There is at least the idea of a solution. This means that 
problem points a directfon to follow while on the other hand 'aporia' is this 
indeterminate, unknowable path to follow. lt is " ... not knowing where to 
go" (Derrida, 1993: 12). What 'aporia' suggests is a nonpassage and an 
experience of nonpassage. This experience makes it impossible for us to 
constitute a problem. The subject of this experience cannot be found in 
the context but rather in the experience itself. Derrida talks about a kind 
of fasdnation in this nonpassage which is "paralyzing us ... in a way that is 
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not necessarily negative: before a door, a threshold, a border, a line, or 
simply the edge or the approach of the other as such" (1993, 12). 
Placing Heidegger and his thoughts about death as the subject of 
concern necessitates an approach from the side of the aporia of time in 
order to support the impossibility of determining time as entity and 
nonentity. Derrida indicates that the fault in Heidegger's thinking of death 
has its rootsin this misconstruction of time. For Heidegger time becomes a 
question only in relation to death or vice versa because Dasein must be 
understood as being-towards- death. 'The now is and is not what it is ... it 
only 'scarcely is what it is. lnsofar as it has been, it no tonger is. But 
insofar as it will be, as future comes or as death, it is not yet" (Derrida, 
1993: 14). 
Derrida's concern is not to demonstrate Heidegger's or any other 
philosophy's misconstructed therefore impracticable conceptions but 
rather to question the possibility of an experience of the aporetic which 
m ay or m ay not be the outcom e of such a misconstruction. 
1 believe that we would misunderstand it if we tried 
to hold it to its most literal meaning; an absence of path, a 
paralysis before roadblocks, the immobilization of thinking, 
the impossibility of advancing a barrier blacking the future. 
On the contrary, it seems to me that the experience of the 
aporia, such as de Man deciphers it, gives or promises the 
thinking of the path, provokes the thinking of the very 
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possibility of what still remains unthinkable or unthought, 
indeed, impossible. (Derrida, 1989: 132) 
For Derrida, the importance of aporias internal to Heidegger's 
discourse nevertheless threatens his philosophy. 'These aporias risk 
interrupting the very possibility of its functioning and leading it to ruin" 
(Derrida, 1993: s28). 
2. 1. 1 Possibility of my own death 
Death in Heidegger, for Derrida is the most important aporia as 
Dasein must be understood as being-towards death. That is the pure 
possibility for Dasein and it is conceived as my possibility that is to say any 
relation with death is always a relation with 'my death'. What must be 
understood from 'Dasein' is, to put it in Heidegger's words, 'Being-the-Da'. 
The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-
in-the-world is itself in every case its 'there' (Da). 
According to the farnilfar signification of the word, the 
'there' points to a 'here' and a 'yonder' .. .'here' and 'yonder' 
are possible only in a 'there'- that is to say , only if there is 
an entity which has made a disclosure of spatiality as the 
Being of the 'the re'. This entity carries in i ts ownmost Being 
the character of not being closed off. In the expressian 
'there' we have in view this essential disclosedness ... (1962: 
171) 
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Dasein; being-there is importance in terms of death as the term 
itself suggests a border and loses its meaning when being passes to the 
other side by dying. What 1 understand from this term is something like 
being's being addressed to this side of the border in its broadest sense. 
Having Heidegger's emphasis on Dasein in mind we can say that he is not 
actually interested in 'beyond'. He only mentions entity's situation as the 
only possibility that passes -as if towards- this so called 'beyond' and 
Dasein's impossibility as such. 
Heidegger says that; with death, Dasein encounters what still stands 
before it, and what is always impending. Death is a character of Dasein, 
which belongs to it and constitutes the totality of it but can only be 
understood as such when it reaches its wholeness and is conceived as such. 
With death, which at its time is only my dying, my 
ownmost being stands before me, is imminent: ı stand 
before my can-be at every moment. The being that 1 will 
be in the 'last' of my Dasein, that 1 can be at any moment, 
this possibility is that of my ownmost ·ı am·, which means 
that 1 will be my ownmost ı. 1 myself am this possibility, 
where death is my death. There is no such thing as death in 
general. (Heidegger, 1992: 313) 
In Aporias, Derrida mentions this imminent character of death by 
quoting from Louis-Vincent Thomas who says that, a human being is old 
enough to die when he is bom, and this daim is incorrectly attributed to 
Heidegger by him. Derrida departing from this daim states that Heidegger 
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places Dasein in a position of surpassing, transgressing a borderline, a 
limit, an end of his own being. Derrida's suggestion of an aporetic 
experience works at this point; dealing with the possibilities of the "coming 
to pass" by surpassing at this limit; "Perhaps nothing ever comes to pass 
except on the line of transgression, the death of some 'trespassing"' 
(Derrida, 1993: 33). 
'When Dasein reaches wholeness in death, then it can no tonger be 
experienced by me as mine" (Heidegger, 1992: 308). What does Heidegger 
mean by that? The essence of being according to him is to have something 
before itself , that is to say Dasein's incompleteness is the essence of its 
being because Dasein reaches completeness only at an end, in death. The 
whole in Heidegger is never given but there is still the possibility of 
reaching wholeness for Dasein which at the same time brings the 
impossibility of it as it becomes no langer Dasein when it reaches its 
wholeness. Giorgio Agamben in his book Language and Death: The Place of 
Negativity states Heidegger's concern as such; 
... the experience of death in question ta kes the form 
of an 'anticipation' of its own possibility, altough this 
possibility boasts no positive factual content. lt gives 
Dasein nothing to be actualized, nothing which Dasein, as 
actual, could itself be. lnstead it represents the possibility 
of the impossibility of existence in general, of the 
disappearance of every reterence to ... and of all existing. 
Only in the purely negative register of this being- for-
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death, when it experiences the most radicat impossibility, 
can Dasein reach its ownmost proper dwelling ptace and 
comprehend itsetf as totatity. (2) 
Dasein atways tacks something insofar as it is, atways incomptete. 
What then is the use of tatking about a whoteness which makes it 
impossibte as an entity. This whoteness beton gs to something no tonger 
existent. There is the impossibility of a non-existing entity's possesion. A 
conclusion as such can be drawn; in essence what is in each instance mine 
is an incomptete Dasein. The whoteness achieved by death makes Dasein 
vanish. Possibility of a comptete Dasein is the impossibitity of Dasein itself. 
This also points to an impossibility of experiencing my own Dasein in its 
wholeness. Heidegger grounds his argument by making a characterization 
of being . Dasein as being-in-the-wortd necessitates this incompleteness to 
define his being as the being-with -one- another. Heidegger suggests that 
what is impossibte for me -experiencing my own death- is possible for the 
others who used to define my being in terms of Dasein's being- with-one-
another. "For with the dying and the death of the others, an entity is still 
on hand, but certainly not their Dasein" (Heidegger, 1992: 309). Heidegger 
makes a distinction between the being of Dasein and the entity as such 
which is the 'world-thing'. 
When Dasein reaches the mode of being in which 
nothing more in it is outstanding, that is, when finished as 
Dasein, then in its being- finished it no langer is what it is. 
Being- finished, when asserted about Dasein, means no-
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longer- being. By contrast , an entity encountered in 
concern can totally fulfill its function as something used or 
produced only when it is finished. Being-finished, asserted 
about a world- thing on hand and becoming available. 
(Heidegger, 1992: 311) 
Derrida will claim that these distinctions are not clear enough 
throughout the whole discourse on death but 1 think this point is important 
in order to understand Blanchot's theory of resemblance which will be 
explored in the next chapter as he mentions image's and cadaver's 
resembling each other. This issue is crucial as it may be interpreted as an 
attempt to reduce the principle resource of art to cadavers. 
Dasein's being- with- one-another and construction as Being-towards 
-death provides a relation with oneself through which the '1' is grasped as a 
Subject. This helps Heidegger to define the self in terms of its fate and 
community in terms of destiny. Some other definitions of community m ay 
be recalled at this point with their relation to death; Giorgio Agamben's 
community for example, which has necessarily a negative ground. For him 
the fate and destiny of a community does not have its origin in itself or 
outside itself except on negative grounds like death. Heidegger also places 
his community on the bases of a sharing finitude, which suggests a common 
destiny for all individuals namely death. We can also consider Blanchot's 
community'; Leslie Hill, mentioning Blanchot's affinity to levinas, states 
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that for these two death is the impossibility of possibility and that the 
. logic of 'il ya' (there is) excludes: 
... not being available as experience at all, it belongs 
to the realm not of possibility but rather 
impossibility ... Death , then, is not self-relation but a 
relation (without relation) with Otherness and the 
community to which death gives rise, as Blanchot argues in 
The Unavowable Community, is not a community that 
embodies propriety and truth, but a community, in so far 
as it is founded at all, that is necessarily traversed by 
impossibility and irredudble heteronomy. (Gill, 15) 
This is a community which suggests a form of continual 'limit-
experience' through which relation to others and self questioning is 
possible. "If human existence is an existence that puts itself radically and 
constantly in question, it cannot itself alone have that possibility which 
always goes beyond it, for then the question would always be a taeking 
question" (quoted from Clark, 140). If we understand Heidegger's aim in 
Being and Time as putting human existence in question departing from 
death, and consider that Derrida derives an aporetic experience from here, 
we can again see the parallelism between aporetic experience and limit-
experience which is necessarily the death of another. "One's own death is 
not one's 'own·, since it is not an experience, there is no self to experience 
it" (Clark: 140). 
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Heidegger may be trying to overcome this aporia by daiming that 
Dasein in its everyday self- interpretation constructs a relation with itself 
through which Dasein sees, interprets, considers and names itself in terms 
of what it does. If one is what one does then there is the possibility of an 
exchange of experiences among beings as being- in -the- world. That is to 
say "one can within limits take over the Dasein of the other" 
(Heidegger, 1992: 310). Heidegger himself accepts that this supposition also 
fails when what is replaced is the being of what constitutes the end of 
Dasein aiming at its wholeness. ''No one can relieve the other of his own 
dying" (Heidegger, 1992: 310). Because the experience as such is unique 
and one can die only for once. " ... death is in each instance and in its time 
my own death; it belongs to me insofar as 1 am" (Heidegger, 1992: 31 O). 
Heidegger puts Dasein's being towards death as an authentic 
possibility of being and daims that this should be understood as an 
indefinite certainty of being. This authentic relationship of being has to be 
maintained asa possibility because 'being' is this possibility itself. Here we 
need to understand what is meant by 'possibility'. The possible, says 
Blanchot, is an empty frame as it doesn't suggest a reality, it is more than 
reality in the sen se that it carries the power to 'be'. "Possibility establishes 
and founds reality: one is what one is only if one has the power to be" 
(Blanchot, 1993: 42). Blanchot repeats Heidegger's daim that; " ... man not 
only has possibilities, but is his possibility" (1993: 42) or impossibility? 
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To put an end to the subject 1 want to return to the discussions in 
Derrida' s Aporias. Derrida sees the whole existential analysis of death as a 
thinking of the possible. But this possibility of possible does not only 
suggest Dasein's running forward toward death which is the "utmost, 
though indefinite, yet certain possibility", but also a Dasein as an entity. 
Derrida points out possible confusions of distinguishing Dasein from entity. 
He mentions three types of entity in Heideggerian discourse; Dasein, 
being-present- at- hand (Vorhandensein) and being-ready-to -hand 
(Zuhandensein), and claims that he grounds his whole discourse on death 
on the distinctions between these three types of entity. Derrida daim s 
that Heidegger does not clearly draw these distinctions. 
If being- possible is the being proper to Dasein, then 
the existential analysis of the death of Dasein will have to 
make of this possibility i ts theme ... the analysis of death is 
submitted to the ontological law that rules the being of 
Dasein, whose name is 'possibility'. But death is possibility 
par excellence ... (1993: 63) 
Heidegger on the other hand warns that, if death is to be 
understood in terms of the characteristics of Being of Dasein then we have 
to mention Dasein's existence, facticity and falling which are fundemental 
characteristics. 
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2.1.2 Being-towards-death 
If death is the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein and carries 
the possibility of taking place at any moment, then this indeterminacy of 
its arrival must be examined in terms of Heidegger's understanding of time. 
Mark C. Taylor in his article "Back to the Future" points out Heideggerian 
relations between time and death in Blanchot and claims that their 
attitude put Being as a tendeney towards future. "Being is being toward 
the nonarrival of that which comes toward" (Taylor: 18). Blanchot 
concludes that ; 
The T will never arrive at it, nor will the individual, 
this particle of dust that 1 am, nor eventheself of all of us 
that is supposed to represent absolute self-consciousness. 
Only the ignorance that the 1- who- dies would incarnate by 
acceding to the space where in dying it never dies in the 
first person as anT will reach it. (1993: 209) 
Blanchot here defines a future which is not mine, an infinite future 
which is ungraspable and impossible, which therefore belongs to an Other 
inthesense that it is always ahead of me. Blanchot's 'neuter' comes out of 
such an impossibility of my own future which opens space for alterity . 
Derrida claims that Dasein's attitude is awaiting itself by awaiting its 
most proper possibility, and ownmost potentiality-for-being. Then he 
immediately mentions that waiting necessitates an arrivant, an other. 
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There is alsa the possibility of waiting for each other which ruins 
Heideggerian discourse in the sense that to be able to meet at a border 
one should arrive late and this is contradictory with Dasein's being-
towards-death. 
Derrida departing from Heidegger's aporia -possibility of 
impossibility- concludes that, if "death- to be expected- is the unique 
occurrence of this possibility of impossibility" (1993: 72) and only Dasein 
can grasp and in a sense overcomes this aporia then a certain relation 
should have been constructed between possible and impossible by 
Heidegger who may be just tatking about the improbable character of 
death - improbable in a B tanehatian sen se that " ... w ere the re a meeting 
point between possibility and impossibility , the improbable would be this 
point" (Blanchot, 1993: 41) -. Actually what Heidegger does is to show the 
impossibility of death for 'this' as the possibility of it for 'that'. Derrida 
says that; "lt is nothing less than the end of the world, with each death, 
each time that we expect no tonger to be able to await ourselves and each 
other, hence no tonger to be able to understand each other" (1993: 75). 
2.1. 3 Possibility as lmpossibility 
Derrida departing from Blanchot's The Writing of the Disaster, 
claims that Heidegger and Blanchot may have different interests but same 
outcome in their thinking of death as 'the possibility of impossibility'. Their 
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construction of 'future' differs as Blanchot never neglects Nietzschean 
'eternal recurrance' which excludes present in such a construction. What is 
suggested through 'eternal recurrence' is to live in the past what is future 
and live the future as past says Blanchot: 'The emptiness of the future: 
death holds our future there and the emptiness of the past: there death 
has i ts tom b" (Holland: 294 ). Contrary to Heidegger, Blanchot refers to an 
immemorial past in terms of death when he says: 
Dying means: you are dead already, in an 
immemorial past, of a death which was not yours, which 
you have thus neither known nor lived, but under the 
threat of which you believe you are called upon to live, you 
await it henceforth in the future, constructing a future to 
make it possible at last- possible as something that will 
take place and will belong to the realm of 
experience.(1995: 65) 
In his article 'The Exigency of the Return" published in 1970, 
Blanchot takes death as something we are unused to in the sense that our 
attitude towards death always entails a fear of something unfamiliar, 
horrifying. Blanchot says that the thoughts of death do not necessarily put 
death as something to be thought not even thinking about death. The 
impossibility of dying and thinking instantaneously creates the impossibility 
of thinking of death as any last thought would inevitably belong to 'living'. 
Death, as the possibility of the impossible as such, is 
a figure of the aporia in which 'death' and death can 
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replace- and this is a metonymy that carries the name 
beyond the name of name - all that is only possible as 
impossible, if there is such a thing ... (Derrida, 1993: 79) 
Derrida's emphasis on aporia of death's being a metonymy brings to 
one's mind Blanchot's approach which suggests that we have to name it in 
order to master and get rid of it. According to Blanchot the word has 
meaning, provided that it rids us of the object it names by pushing us 
towards an unawareness of its presence and concrete reminder. This is the 
possibility of authentic language's destructive function which goes along 
with the representative one. Blanchot says that; authentic language brings 
about disappearances and renders the object absent and annihilates it. 
This point is important in order to understand 'limit-experience' which 
necessarily privileges language to be able to construct the passivity 
through which the impossibility of death is drawn from its 'non-event' 
character. Blanchot questions the relations between philosophy and art in 
terms of death and negation. What he names as "the loss of death" is 
simply the naming itself which makes it possible for us to grasp the loss of 
the presence which is present in its disappearance. Any response affirms 
this loss and through affirming tries to master it. This mastering is nothing 
but a control over the extreme, namely death. We might recall here 
"supreme mastery" in Bataille but Blanchot's concern is to capture the 
power of the negative interiorized by death. What Blanchot borrows from 
Hegel is his approach to language which works through negation, -negation 
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as an imminent character of thought that continually deconstructs it-, 
which ,to put it in Hegel's words; " ... immediately overturns what it names 
in order to transform it into something else" (Blanchot, 1993: 35). Blanchot 
finds the traces of power and capacity attributed to death in language. 
What makes death impossible is its relation with the idea of an infinite 
future which always remains beyond one's experience. We lose power 
when we think in terms of a possibility which inevitably refers to an 
obscure future. The possible experience of this obscurity should be 
questioned, 
... this experience w ere that of a time out of 
synchrony and as though deprived of the dimension of 
passing beyond, henceforth neither passing nor ever having 
had to pass. (Blanchot, 1993: 44) 
This is the point where this so-called power passes to language. 
Blanchot in his article "Literature and the Right to Death" clearly states a 
writer's- or an artist's - relation to this infinite future as a privilege of 
being master of everything; "But he is only master of everything, he 
possesses only the infinite; he lacks the finite, limit escapes him" 
(Blanchot, 1999: 373). 
What we overcome by death is our relation to a limit. Any 
philosophy or art influenced by the idea of death questions 'limit' as it has 
to refer to an infinite which does not necessarily leave behind the 
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impossibility of passing beyond. Any infinite oriented experience should 
forget 'li mit' as it is suggested by 'possibility'. This experience has i ts roots 
in 'impossibility'. The impossible in Blanchot is a "non-power (non-pouvoir) 
that would not be the simple negation of power" (1993: 44). This non-
power character of impossibility is the source of its impotence which 
escapes all mastering, achievement or completion . 
... where dying means losing the time in which one 
can still come to an end and entering into the infinite 
'present' of a death impossible to die, a present toward 
which the experience of suffering is manifestly oriented, 
the suffering that no langer allows us the time to put a 
limit to it- even by dying- since we will alsa have lost death 
as a limit. (Blanchot, 1993; 45) 
This nevertheless leads us to a passivity as Taylor says; "For 
Blanchot, as for Heidegger, that w hi ch is beyand being and non-being 
approaches when one 'waits for something that will not have taken place' " 
(Taylor: 19). lmpossibility put neither as a negation nar as an affirmation 
but to a certain extent grasp of the being which has already preceded 
being. That is what through death disappears but cannot be grasped. This 
is the grasp of the immediate present and presence through which 
impossibility is situated in relation with the Outside. "lmpossibility is 
relation with the Outside; and since this relation without relation is the 
passian of that does not allow itself to be mastered through patience, 
impossibility is the passian of the Outside" (Blanchot, 1993: 46 ). 
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There still remains a question in terms of 'limit -experience' which is 
supposed to be the experience " ... affirming without anything being 
affirmed finally affirming nothing." Any work of art, using the power of 
language which suggests an experience of the infinite, and thus attempts 
to construct the real, the possible -mimicking the world- fails to fulfill its 
promise. Following Blanchot through his article we can find what is meant 
by this promise; 
The realm of the imaginary is not a strange region 
situated beyond the world, it is the world itself, but the 
world as entire, manifold, the worldasa whole. That's why 
it is not in the world, because it is the world, grasped and 
realized in its entirety by the global negation of all the 
individual realities contained in it, by their 
disqualification, their absence, by the realization of that 
absence itself. (1999: 373) 
What is excluded in this promise is the time of the possible. The 
world of art on the other hand does not simply suggest an impossibility. 
Blanchot says that it answers to it, reminds the possibility of impossibility; 
"naming the possible, responding to the impossible" (1993: 48). Any 
rational answer is included in this response; as it is a response to "what is 
not yet heard, an attentive response in which the impatient waiting for the 
unknown and the desiring hopefor presence are affirmed" (Blanchot, 1993: 
48). 
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2.2 Limit -Experience 
Blanchot in his book The lnfinite Conversation radically questions 
'experience' and he does this by rethinking 'experience' together with 
philosophers of 'experience'. lt can be said that he com es very close to the 
idea of 'inner experience' -in terms of Bataille who claims that interior 
experience "is the manner in which the radical negation that no longer has 
anything to negate is affirmed" (208) - by suggesting 'contestation'. lnterior 
experience's emphasis on 'nothing' in terms of affirmation, manifestation 
and communication seem problematic for Blanchot as this 'nothing' should 
be placed on safe grounds other than a dialectical movement. He mentions 
'dialectics' as it belongs to the time of the possible and never neglects the 
power by which 'nothing' can be affirmed. 
Blanchot insists on the extremity of the impossible and the non-
power of it. And the proper experience of this impossible is the 'limit 
experience'. He says that; 
For thought, the limit-experience represents 
something like a new origin. What it offers to thought is 
the essential gift, the prodigality of affirmation; an 
affirmation, for the first time, that is not a product (the 
result of a double negation), and thereby escapes all the 
movements, oppositions and reversals of dialectical reason, 
which, having completed itself before this affirmation, can 
no longer reserve a role for it under its reign. (Blanchot, 
1993: 209) 
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This experience suggests the fall of the limits which can only reach 
us at the limit. This is the handling of the obscure future by making it 
present. 'The experience of non-experience. Detour from everything 
visible and invisible" (Blanchot, 1993: 210). 
The limitlessness beyand the limit may be understood as an 
alternative law since for Blanchot limitlessness is itself inherent in the 
limit. Leslie Hill in his book, Blanchot; Extreme Contemporary, states that; 
... though the two exigencies - that of the limit and 
that of the limitlessness of the limit- are disjoined from 
one another, they do not exist in isolation from each other; 
and while the limitlessness beyand the limit belongs to the 
limit, so to speak, as its very condition of possibility and 
impossibility, the reverse is alsa true, for without the 
interval inscribed by the limit the limitlessness that lies 
beyand it would not be possible either. In this w ay, the 
limitlessness beyand the limit may be said both to follow 
and precede the limit; just as the demand of limitlessness 
exceeds that of the limit, limitlessness itself is inseparable 
from its own necessary interruption. (93-94) 
What Blanchot suggests about the paradox inherent in the cantext of limit-
limitlessness is that once the limitlessness of the limit is grasped in its 
necessary impossibility then the structure of the limit or limitlessness 
allows one (Blanchot) to generate relations between inside- outside, 
possible, impossible, perhaps through Derrida's 'chiasmic double 
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invagination' as Hill suggests. This experience finds its necessary condition 
in literary space in Blanchot. 
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Chapter 3: Death and Representation 
3.1 Image Experience 
to read the word death without negation is to 
withdraw from it the cutting edge of decision and the 
power to negate; it is to cut oneself off from possibility 
and the true, and also from death as true event. lt is to 
surrender to the indistinct and the undetermined, to the 
emptiness anterior to events, where the end has all the 
heaviness of starting over. (Blanchot, 1982: 242) 
Blanchot's writing supposes a pass from '1' to 'He', il, the Neuter. 
What he calls the space of literature in which the real is already imaginary 
and detached from its truth and identity, which is interminable and 
incessant, is the Neuter. The Neuter suggests an inaction and a potentiality 
to not-be. Blanchot deseribes it as the shadow of time, of the real. Writing 
process does not work with the intention of the writer's expressing himself 
through word s, rather with the shadow, the appearance of the words that 
reveal independent of the will of the writer. That is why the writer is the 
one without a self. 
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The lass of subjectivity in writing can be understood as a kind of 
dying. From this perspective, death becomes what dying produces as the 
work of art, the trace of dying which nevertheless avoids to refer to a 
completion and manifests itself as the presence of everything finished. To 
put it in Blanchot's words quoted by Bruns; 'The book is to writing what 
death would be to the mavement of dying" (Bruns: 82). 
The Neuter has no power to be able to say '1' and has no power to 
create characters whose freedam is given. Wall quoting from Blanchot's 
The Essential Solitude, defines the writing process as; 
To write, to enter the Neuter, is to arrange language 
under fascination and, through language, in language, to 
remain in contact with the absolute millieu, where the 
thing becomes an image again, where the image, which 
had been allusion to a figure, becomes an illusion to what 
is without figure ... when the re is no world yet. ( 116) 
The absolute millieu refers to an impossibility of pertaining to any 
place in the world, and points to a detachment from the real in the 
absence of inside or outside. 'To write is to lose oneself in the region 
where there is nothing to be revealed, expressed, meant or shown, 
because nothing is. lt is the region of ambiguity, abondoned, by 
references, emptied of subject and object- where all is such as it is. 
lrreparably so" (Wall: 117). Blanchot privileges writing as it affirms 
existence- the thing in itself , the real. This is a pure taking place of the 
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real. By sugggesting a taking place of the 'real' Blanchot intentionally risks 
the presence of real. 
This is the experience of art which indicates the passion for Outside, 
neuter, limitlessness and absence through which nothingness reveals. For 
Blanchot, the artist neither creates nor reveals. Art's concem has to be 
understood in terms of 'image'. Blanchot's approach to art can be traced in 
his approach to philosophy which plays with the etemity of concepts, as in 
terms of art 'image· takes the place of concepts. This is not simply a 
substitution of image for concept rather, -not rejecting this approach-
transgression of the concept. What is suggested here is a link between 
concepts of Blanchot' s philosophy to his understanding of 'image' which 
necessitates a certain kind of understanding from the point of view of his 
philosophy. Art is the most proper medium to generate an approach to life 
and death as it suggets a withdrawal from 'power' and 'present' and creates 
the possibility of a passivity. Any so called withdrawal does not necessarily 
carry the possibility of a new beginning or a promise of beyond but 
nevertheless points to a release from ourselves. 
'The whole of our world, with its elementary and intellectually 
elaborated givens, can touch us musically, can become an image" says 
Levinas. This is the possibility for the subject to experience itself other 
than as itself and impossibility of grasping the difference between art and 
life which is not a necessary category. 
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Blanchot in his book The Space of Literature goes along with 
Heidegger and says that the work of art is not any sort of thing at all 
rather, it is- and nothing more ... Beyond that it is nothing. Whoever wants 
to make it express more finds nothing, finds that it expresses nothing .. 
(Blanchot, 1982: 22). Levinas would define this as 'existence without 
existents', and it is 'existence without being' in Blanchot. ..Existence that is 
external to anything existing, but not as an outside is external to an inside, 
nor as a domain is to occupants .. (Bruns: 58). Existence without being is 
the disclosure of being for which there is not a necessary category of 
visible presence or invisible absence. This being- consistent with Levinas' il 
y a - appears rather as the presence of an absence, appears in its 
disappearance. Even through the conditions of nothingness is achieved the 
fact that 'there is' is undeniable. Not that there is this or that in particular, 
but rather that the very scene of being is opened; 'there is'. Being's 
effacement itself is Blanchot's concern in The Space of Uterature where 
he speaks of resemblance, the duplidty of revelation- which shares the 
same concern with Heidegger's ontological revelation - according to which, 
what reveals itself at the same time conceals itself and does not take 
refuge in simple invisibility. (1993: 29) 
The image is the duplidty of revelation. The image 
is what veils by revealing; it is the veil that reveals by 
reveiling in all the ambiguous indedsion of the word 
reve al. The image is image by means of this duplidty, 
being not the object's double, but the initial division that 
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then permits the thing to be figured; still further back than 
this doubling it is a folding, a turn of the turning , the 
'version' that is always in the process of inverting itself and 
that in itself bears the back and forth of a divergence. 
(Blanchot, 1993: 30) 
3.2 Resemblance Theory 
Understanding Blanchot's approach to the problem of representation 
necessitates another aporetic experience. He takes the subject in terms of 
image and using certain elements that constructs our world of 
representation such as identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance, 
derives a theory of resemblance. As Foucault has shown, the classical 
world of representation, along with other principles of reason, suggests the 
resemblance of perception. Levinas claims that a sign directly refers to its 
object, but an image resembles it. Departing from Levinas, Thomas Carl 
Wall states that " an image resembles an object, but resemblance is not 
the result of a comparison between two realms; the real and the 
imaginary" (Wall: 17). There is a certain fact that the image is the 
possibility of the object to be represented and possibility of representation 
itself. As the real is always already approached by its image, resemblance 
can be traced in the real itself. Blanchot's theory suggests more from the 
point of view of the thing's and its image's relation in terms of 
resemblance. "Resemblance is not a means of imitating life but of making 
it inaccessible, of establishing it in a double that is permenant and escapes 
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from life" (Blanchot, 1997: 32). That is why resemblance theory includes 
cadaverous resemblance and does not make living figures its subject 
matter. "Men are without resemblance" (Blanchot, 1997: 32). This attitude 
of Blanchot's which privileges image instead of the object itself -"we see 
then we imagine" (1982: 255)-, is consistent with his theory of language 
which gives precedence to poetic language over ordinary language. 
Blanchot will go further and say that he gives ontological priority to the 
corpse over the living person. "One must wait for the cadaverous 
appearance, the idealizatian by death and the eternalization of the end for 
a being to take on the great beauty that is resemblance, the truth of itself 
ina reflection" (Blanchot, 1997: 32) 
Yes , it is he, the dear living person, but all the 
same it is more than he. He is more beautiful, more 
imposing; he is really menumental and so absolutely 
himself that it is as if he were doubled by himself, joined 
to his solemn impersonality by resemblance and by the 
image. This magnified being, imposing and proud, which 
impresses the living as the appearance of the original never 
perceived until now ... may well bring to mind the great 
images of classical art. (Blanchot, 1982: 258) 
The dear departed we perceive is nothing but the cadaver lying 
stateless. But on the other hand it is not the same thing as the corpse 
either. We cannot talk about its being identical with the cadaver. There is 
certainly a non-existence of the departed, yet in the corpse, the departed 
comes to resemble herself. As soon as we perceive something resembling 
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the dep~rted, despite the fact that what we perceive is the resemblance 
itself- through which we pass to the realm of the real- we nonetheless 
derive a presence from its absence. 
Blanchot's 'Two Versions of the lmaginary" begins by asking 'What is 
an image". Image finds i ts necessary condition when there is nothing and 
the affirmation of this nothingness makes it disappear. Blanchot's 
formulations of image as the presence of absence, the impossibility that 
death be present in person or appearance of disappearance itself when 
everything disappears, all relate us to the obscurity of the existence. Art in 
this sense affirms that there is nothing other than the world, nothing 
beyond it. There is only the nothing. Through art we grasp what we 
already defined as existence. But the only existence as such belongs to art 
itself. Artthen points to a beyond but insofar as art itself remains this side 
of the 'beyond' what it points to belongs to this side as well. 
A cadavre is the perfect form of the image, that which resembles 
itself and falls into the absolute milieu as it escillates between here and 
nowher, between what is called real and imaginary. lt carries the 
characteristics of a double or a mirror image of the original but it is itself 
the original and has the power to risk the reality of what it resembles as it 
is marked by death. Death functions as the imagination in terms of the 
cadavre. 
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Death produces a form of the imaginary more 
fascinating than any original because it haunts the original, 
haunts the world of the original, which is the world left 
behind: what remains with the remains. (Bruns: 66) 
Blanchot speaks of resemblance, the duplicity of revelation- which 
is the same as Heidegger's ontological revelation- in which what reveals 
itself does not give itself up to sight, just as it does not take refuge in 
simple invisibility. 
Heidegger in his famous article 'The Origin of the Work of Art" 
makes a parallelism between works of art and broken tools in the sense 
that they share the same capacity to disclose the original being of things 
which has been covered up by their having been adapted to perform 
particular functions" (Gregg: 23). 
By analogy, we might alsa recall that a tool, when 
damaged, becomes its image ... ln this case the tool, no 
langer disappearing into its use, appears. This appearance 
of the object is that of resemblance and reflection; the 
object's double, if you will. The category of art is linked to 
the possibility for objects to 'appear', to surrender, that is 
to the pure and simple resemblance behind which there is 
nothing -but being ... only that which is abandoned to the 
image appears, and everything that appears is, in this 
sense imaginary. (Blanchot, 1982: 258-259) 
The work of art according to Blanchot, presents itself in a 
metamorphoses through which it eternalizes itself and become equal to all 
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arts. This becoming equal to all arts points toward a return to absence 
which is not other than eternity. 'The image, we feel, is joy, for it is a 
limit beside the indefinite, the possibility of suspension at the heart of a 
shifting movement" (Blanchot, 1997: 40). The image is nothingness in the 
sense that it appears at the limit of image . The image and nothingness 
find their necessary conditions at the limit. 
But perhaps one must ad d that the image, capable 
of negating nothingness, is also the gaze of nothingness 
upon us .... that is why the image seems so profound and so 
empty, so threatening and so attractive , always richer in 
meaning than those with which we provide it, and also 
poor, null, and silent, for in this dark powerlessness, 
deprived of a master, advances; it is the powerlessness of 
death asa beginning-again (Blanchot, 1997: 40). 
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Chapter 4: Psychoanalysis And Death 
Blanchot suggests that death has two aspects One is personal and 
concems the T who encounters this aspect of death in a present where 
everything comes to pass and signifies the personal disappearance of the 
person. "Despite appearances, this death always comes from without, even 
at the moment when it constitutes the most personal possibility, and from 
the past, even at the moment when it is most present" (Deleuze, 113). The 
second is impersonal and it belongs neither to present nor past but is 
always in the mood of coming. Gilles Deleuze in his book Difference and 
Repetition claims that it is in the second aspect of death that Blanchot is 
more interested, 
... refers to the state of free differences when they 
are no tonger subject to the form imposed upon them by an 
T or an ego, when they assume a shape which excludes my 
own coherence no less than that of any identity 
whatsoever. (113) 
Blanchot makes these two aspects of death irrelational to each 
other and claims that even in the case of suicide they don't coincide with 
one anather or become identical. " ... What never happens to me, so that 
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never do 1 die, but 'they die', people always die other than themselves, at 
the level of neutrality and the impersonality of an eternal They" (Blanchot, 
1982: 241). 
Freudian psychoanalysis on the other hand deals with the first 
aspect of death in Blanchot. As the main concern of this thesis was to 
follow Blanchot's path in understanding the theme of death in terms of 
philosophy and art, psychoanalytic approaches to death and representation 
is intentionally excluded from the thesis despite the fact that certain links 
could have been constructed. Mentioning these possibilities seems to be 
necessary because the importance of death to any theory of representation 
makes psychoanalysis a subject to be questioned. 
Freud's discussion links the presence of death to aspects of 
repetition- to the compulsion to repeat, the uncanniness of the double 
that repeats its model and which is destined to be repeated-. Blanchot 
states a similar uncanniness in terms of the corpse and representation by 
positing an analogy between the corpse and the image. The uncanniness in 
Blanchot relates to the corpse's belonging to an indefinite reference point 
or a stable position in time and space. This is most clear in his 
resemblance theory according to which cadavreous presence occupies two 
places, the here and nowhere. The other aspect of resemblance theory 
which has the uncanniness in its character is the suggestion that the corpse 
resembles its own double. Refering to the world of the dead it also 
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occupies a place in the world of the living as an appearance in terms of an 
image. Bronfen interprets it as an chiasmic relation; "the corpse as 
uncanny image 1 the image uncannily as corpse" (1993: 12). 
Bronfen quoting from Sarah Kofman says that she, etabarating on 
Blanchot, suggests that; 
the analogy between a representation and a corpse 
resides in the former's seeming status of revenant. What 
makes art effective, she argues, is its self-reflexive 
moment. That moment emerges because, in its 
contingency on lass, art exemplifies a surplus meaning. 
Substituting for an absent object, art represents something 
it both is and is not. At the same time the aesthetic form 
both is and is not eternaL Both a representation and a 
corpse have no clear position even as they elidt a desire 
for stability. Based on a relation of resemblance and 
doubling, a representation functions like a revenant and 
thus, always has death as one of its signifieds. (1993: 12) 
One of the possible concern in terms of psychoanalysis is that it too 
suggests aportas and necessitates an aporetic experience to grasp the 
relation between eros and thanatos which is most clear in Jean Laplanche's 
Life and Death in Psychoanalysis reading of death drive, and pleasure-
unpleasure relations in Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Laplanche 
suggests that the drives in Freudian psychoanalysis correspond to the 
prindples of operations. According to this, he couples the life drive and 
the pleasure prindple functioning accordingly and the death drive and the 
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Nirvana principle. What he points out is the abolishing of the oppositions 
and equations in the comman sense. In terms of pleasure- unpleasure he 
mentions the motive which puts present unpleasure in opposition to the 
pleasure in prospect and provides an equilibrium by suggesting that what 
is pleasure for one system functions as unpleasure for anather one. At this 
point then, it can be questioned whether pleasure is equal to unpleasure; 
If for reasons of convenience , we designate the two 
members of the equation as a positive pole and a negative 
pole, we can continue to state that positive= negative only 
if the 'positive' is not quite a positive, and the 'negative' not 
quite a negative. Or rather; the negative is not quite the 
negative of the positive it is opposed to. (Laplanche: 1 05) 
The same ambivalence can be traced in the relation between eros 
and thanatos. Laplanche finds the final aim of life's being put as death, 
problematic- which can be deduced from Freud's daim that "the organism 
wants not simply to die but to die in i ts own way" - (Laplanche: 1 07). 
Laplanche mentions that contrary to Eros, the death drive does not posess 
its own energy. If the death drive's energy is libido according to Laplanche, 
then it may well be concluded that "death drive is the very soul, the 
constitutive principle, of libidinal circulation" (124). That is to say some 
aspects of erotic love are already identified with the death drive in 
Freudian psychoanalysis. Death as both the opposite of life and its ground-
i ts sustaining force-. 
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Derrida in his book The Post Card (From Socrates to Freud and 
Beyand states the intentional use of 'beyond's a-thetic functioning 
reminding us of Blanchotian 'step beyond' (pas au-dela) and says that the 
athesis of beyond points towards some undecidability; 
lt is not fortuitous that the a-thesis is indefinitely 
suspended as concems life death. lt is not fortuitous that it 
speaks of the enigmatic death drive which appears 
disappears, appears to disappear, appears in order to 
disappear in Beyond ... 1 call it enigmatic because it appears 
disappears while telling many stories and making many 
scenes, causing or permitting them to be told. Occasionally 
these are called fables or myths. (1987: 262) 
Derrida puts Freudian death as that which is not opposable 
therefore already, life death. He also suggests that Freud manages to stay 
in the realm of dialectics despite the structure of alteration without 
opposition he sets. 
4. 1 Repetition and Representation 
Another concem would be -departing from Blanchot's daim that: 
'The cadaverous presence establishes a relation between here and 
nowhere" (Blanchot, 1982: 256) - a mouming process which involves an 
identification between the moumer and the dead one as -to put it in 
Elizabeth Bronfen's words- "they are both situated between the world of 
the living and the world of the dead" (1993: 106). The mouming subject 
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makes it possible to question death in terms of psychoanalysis as it 
necessitates a questioning of the concepts of repetition and 
representation. She claims that both representation and mourning 
processes puts the repetition of a lost object, a beloved or a model at the 
heart of their concerns. Therefore mourning can be seen analogous to 
representation in the sense that "they both deny a loss they are 
simultaneously forced to acknowledge" (Bronfen, 1993: 13). 
Bronfen in her book Over Her Dead Body suggests that 
representations of death in art gives us a strange pleasure as they give the 
impression of canfronting that which doesn't belong to life or the realm of 
real but nonetheless confirm the belief in our own immortality. There is 
certainly death but we never face it in terms of our own. lt is always the 
death of the other and this otherness is maintained as we are confronted 
with it as sameone else's body -unless sameone else's body is a work of art-
and as an image. The aesthetic representations of death in this respect 
provides the most proper way of repressing our knowledge of the reality of 
death. 
Freud's Beyond The Pleasure Principle provides a necessary 
theoretical base to sustain a relation between representations of death 
and psychoanalysis as Freud introduces his canception of death drive by 
using a game of presence and absence, disappearance and re-represencing, 
namely the {ort, da game of his grandson whose mother's death is said to 
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shape the death drive. At the age of one and a half, this little boy who 
used to be very attached to his mather forms the habit of taking small 
objects and throwing away them and quitely picking up them. Freud 
observes that after throwing these little objects he makes a loud sound 
like; o-o-o-o which was interpreted by his mather as German word 'fort' 
which means 'gone', with an expressian of interest and satisfaction on his 
face. Then the child generates this game and playsit with a wooden reel 
with a piece of string tied round it so that to be able to pull back what he 
throws immediately and with the reappearance of the object he makes a 
sound like 'da' which means 'the re'. This game of little boy's can be 
interpreted in several ways but Freud in this sense avoids symbolizations. 
Bronfen suggests that "Freud shifts from matemal loss to patemal 
castration, from the position of mouming to that of rivalry and possession" 
(1992: 28). 
Taking into account that the mather of the little boy, Freud's 
daughter Sophie's death inevitably points towards some symbolization both 
in terms of the child's game and Freud's writing of his book Beyand the 
Pleasure Principle. Bronfen talks about the narcissistic wound experienced 
by Freud and his postpaning the mourning by replacing it with work. She 
says that; "there is a coupling of the narcissistically wounding experience 
of the disappearance of the matemal body with a form of symbolic 
repetition that uncannily articulates both the notian of re-presencing 
retum ('da') and self -absence ('bebi o-o-o')'' (Bronfen, 1992: 29). What 
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Bronfen suggests is that "the real lass is not just caught up in symbolization 
but alsa catches up with symbolization." 
Derrida approaches Freud's text from the point of view of the 
repetition compulsion, which is put into communication with the death 
drive. He suggests that the game is dominated by the repetition 
compulsion, and through the pleasure principle, linked to the death drive. 
The importance of fallawing Freud's writing is that according to Derrida, 
his writing too demonstrates repetition compulsions,- which does not 
necessarily mean to return a previous point-, through which he 
continuously finds out something else that should be put forward: "He 
makes the hypothesis comes back, only as that which has not truly come 
back, that which has only passed by in the specter of its presence" 
(Derrida, 1987: 295). 
Bronfen seems to share the same reading when she says that; 
The dialectic within which repetition, grounded on 
or inspired by death engages the survivor is one where the 
interplay of absence and presence of the maternal body is 
embedded within a matrix of presence /absence, the latter 
in respect to a return to equilibrium and control. If this 
game of fort-da is about mastery over lass and absence, it 
alsa enacts the absence of mastery. (1992: 31) 
By putting repetition as an act of overcoming the narcissistic wound 
which can never be healed, Bronfen introduces the subject of mourning. 
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The act of writing - in Freud's own case - functions as a repetition which 
includes negation of the real world. Representation of death in this sense, 
brings out the discourse of presence in absence and at the same time 
confirms it. Bronfen quoting from A. Green suggests that the work of 
writing presupposes a wound and a loss, a work of mouming. Gillian Rose 
her article "Potter's Field" suggests that "If all meaning is mouming, and 
mouming (or absence) must become our norm (or absence) for there to be 
moming (dawning or future), and not interminable dying, then all meaning 
and all mouming must belong to the dty, to the polis" (191 ). 
That which belongs to the city belongs to the culturally constructed 
structure of death. Culture has to construct death in order to generate a 
power over it which is necessary for the culture to maintain and represent 
itself. Bronfen suggests that; "Representations of death often serve as 
metatrepes for the process of representation itself: its necessity, its 
excess, its faflure, and its uses for the polis" (1993: 4). The relation 
between culture and death is discussed in the context of death's possibility 
and authenticity in Blanchot. 'The task of culture has always been to 
restore a kind of purity to death, to make it authentic, personal, proper-
but alsoto make it possible" (Blanchot, 1993: 180). 
Representation and death drive can be put in relation as they both 
have their rootsin loss. "Any encounter with the real, is an encounter with 
the death drive, as the more that lies behind or disrupts stable 
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representations" (Bronfen, 1993: 13). Derrida's daim on Freud's attitude 
which doesn't oppose life and death and therefore already as life-death 
brings to one's mind the attempt in representations of death that pulls 
death into the realm of real. What is at stake in this sense in the 
representation of death is not just death's but also life's status in terms of 
real. Having in mind that "Every representation of death is a 
misrepresentation" (Bronfen, 1993: 20) then it must be taken into account 
not just what they attempt to represent but also what else also is 
represented in these representations. From this perspective, the 
underlying intention in representation of death may be both risked or 
secured when the idea that life and death, by nature, cannot be taken as a 
binary opposition, becomes so reasonable. 
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Conclusion 
5.1 On Unworking in Blanchot 
In his discussions in which art is necessarily questioned through 
aporetic formulations, Blanchot concludes that- concludes in a manner 
that conclusion itself becomes impossible- image, art, or poetry is the 
presence of absence, the impossibility that nothingness (or death) be 
present in person. To put it in a Blanchotian way, when everything 
disappears, disappearance itself appears. lt remains a task to grasp the 
fact that the touch on the naked existence in the realm of art doesn't 
suggest a 'beyond' to this world. Rather, although the process Blanchot 
involves us suggests us in a kind of obscurity that there is nothing other 
than the world, nothing beyand it, or only the nothing. 
Writing says, each time, there is (nothing else, 
more, or beyond). An Orphic glance can detach from the 
thing of the world i ts predicates, i ts knowability, i ts 
features and distinguishing marks, its history and its form-
none of which are other than it and all of which touch upon 
its ipseity. And, it is there, in this detachment, 'beside 
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itself, as an originary image, that the thing takes place. 
Art 'shows' this. The detachment is its 'each time' - a 
singular, articulated instant, a fatal and dying instant 
unable to give itself its end. Writing gives this to us as 
such; but we cannot grasp this 'gift' for it is no-thing-like. lt 
is how it is. By the same token, the being of writing itself is 
'beside itself in poetry. (Wall: 73) 
The writing process according to Blanchot refers to 'desouvrement" 
(unworking) which should not be understood as a mere impossibility of 
writing, unworking rather suggest the paradoxical condition of a writing. 
Blanchot introduces 'unworking' in terms of image in his account of 
Orpheus' Gaze which by turning on Eurydice, unexpectedly causes a 
transformatian in her from body to image. The task of Orpheus is to bring 
light out of darkness, to bring Eurydice into the daylight and by doing so, 
through the visibility of her, reveal the daylight, give it a form, shape and 
a reality. In this sense his forbidden look at her which makes her disappear 
is a betrayal not for Eurydice but of the law which is already violated, 
which forbids him to 'turn back'. According to Blanchot, Orpheus 
transgresses this law; 
This remark implies that Orpheus has in fact never 
ceased to be turned toward Eurydice: he saw her invisible, 
he touched her intact, in her shadowy absence, in that 
veiled presence which did not hide her absence, which was 
the presence of her infinite absence. Had he not looked at 
her, he would not have drawn her toward him; and 
doubtless she is not there, but in this glance back, he 
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himself is absent. He is no less dead than she- dead, not of 
that tranquil worldly death which is rest, silence, and end, 
but of that other death which is death without end, the 
ordeal of the end's absence. (1982: 172) 
The movement of truth or negation which makes life out of death 
suggests a paraHel movement with Orpheus' move towards Eurydice. The 
movement of art as "the power by which night opens" (Blanchot, 1982: 
171 ). The radiance of truth for art is what Eurydice- not her concealment, 
not her beauty or desire for her but Eurydice herself- is for Orpheus. 
Blanchot's own position is the search for exigency of writing that "speaks 
outside all power to represent and to signify" (Blanchot, 1993: 183). 
Orpheus' forgetting of his work he is to achieve -this forgetting is necessary 
according to Blanchot-, pertains to the impossibility of the completion of 
work but not the work itself. A betrayal is necessary for the work, as the 
work itself demands it. 'Writing begins with the gaze of Orpheus" as this 
gaze no tonger unveils what it sees; it throws what is there to be seen 
outside the realm of the visible-invisible. That's why words appear on the 
page only to return back to their own image, so that the difference 
between being and appearing is extinguishes. "Orpheus' impatience is thus 
at the same time, a proper movement; in it begins what will become his 
own passion, his highest patience, his infinite sojourn in death" (Blanchot, 
1982: 173). 
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Here lies the paradoxical condition of unworking, which makes it 
possible for the work to perform its own disappearance. In his essay 
"Characteristic of the Work of Art", Blanchot suggests that the artwork 
makes what disappears in the object appear; 
The statue glorifies the marble. The painting is not 
made from material ingredients added to canvas; it is the 
presence of this matter, which without it would remain 
hidden to us. And the poem likewise is not made with 
ideas, or with words; it is the point from which words begin 
to become their appearance, and the elemental depth 
upon which this appearance is opened white at the same 
time it closes. (1982: 223) 
Art uses the matter such that it is unused- unworked- just like 
words' detachment from referentiality make them return to their own 
image as an appearance. "lt is the appearance of matter that is, 
eminently, what the work of art is made of' (Wall: 69). The matter does 
not appear in the work of art in its thingly character, rather in its 
appearing as such. The appearance -disappearance of the object reters to 
the elemental depth which is opened at the same time it is closed, which 
"does not reveal itself directly; it is only disclosed hidden in the work" 
(Blanchot, 1982: 171 ). 
Jacques Derrida in his article "By Force of Mourning" defines 'work' 
as; 
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that which makes for a work, for an oeuvre, indeed 
that which works - and works to open; opus and opening, 
oeuvre and ouverture: the work or labor of the oeuvre 
insofar as it engenders, produces, and brings to light, but 
also labor or travail as suffering, as the enduring of force, 
as the pain of the one who gives. Of the one who gives 
birth, who brings to the light of day and gives something to 
be seen, who enables or empowers, who gives the force to 
know and to be able to see- and all these are powers of the 
image, the pain of what is given and of the one who takes 
the pains to help us see, read, and think. (171) 
To read these lines from the perspective of Blanchot and his 
concept of 'desouvrement' may seem irrelevant. Contrary to Blanchot who 
approaches the work from the point of view of the work itself Derrida 
takes the process in terms of the writer, painter, thinker as he asks "what 
does one do when one works?" (1996: 171). 
In Blanchot's oeuvre, death and dying functions for the sake of a 
mode of mourning, emphasizing the interminable characteristics of these 
concepts. As Gillian Rose suggests in her article Potter's Field, 
Mourning in Blanchot becomes poiesis, or 'making', 
which is the elegy to Orpheus, hymn and witness to 
incessant 'desouvrement'- Being without work. For 
Blanchot, the letting go of mourning is not for morning or 
dawning, for commendng, but for the endless reality of 
ending, which our workful beginnings can only, and must 
always, violate. (192) 
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What Derrida does is to introduce a discourse on "the work of 
mourning" and opens up a space for the aporias of death and the 
impossible as mourning is always already interminable, inconsolable and 
i rrecondlable. 
Right up until death- that is what whoever works at 
mourning knows, working at mourning as both their object 
and their resource, working at mourning as one would 
speak of a painter working at a painting but also of a 
machine working at such and such an energy level, the 
theme of work thus becoming their very force, and their 
term, a prindple. (1996: 173) 
Derrida reflecting on Louis Marin's "Des Pouvoirs de l'image", 
questions the aporetic use of force on the subject of mourning, by quoting 
from him "the modalities of a work of mourning of the absolute of force." 
Derrida claims that the mourning in question and the work of mourning are 
not self-evident. "lt is a question, in truth, of the impossible itself' 
(Derrida, 1996: 173). The aporia arises according to Derrida in terms of the 
law of mourning . 
... the law of mourning, and the law of law, always in 
mourning, that it would have to fail in order to succeed, it 
would well have to fail, to fail well. lt would well have to 
fail, for this is what has to be so, in failing well. That is 
what would have to be. And while it is always promised, it 
will never be assured. (1996: 173) 
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The structure of this aporia is not different from any other aporias 
mentioned in the previous chapters, as the renunciation of force in Louis 
Marin refers to an impossibility and unavoidability; " ... both at once, as 
inaccessible as it is ineluctable" (Derrida, 1996: 174). Departing from 
psychoanalytic discourse on mourning which suggests the possibility of both 
a successful 'work of mouming' and 'melancholia' as a failure of mouming, 
Derrida puts the relation between work and force- or without force- as 
aporetic and asks whether 'without- force' refers to our attitude towards 
death - defenselessness of death or dead's defenselessness or "without 
force of the survivors faced with death" -(1996: 174). The powers of the 
image -which is Marin's concern in his book- suggests that to put these 
concepts -power, force, image- in any ontological question would be to 
miss the image and its force as there is always the possibility for these 
concepts to come into being in couples. That is what Derrida calls dynamis 
which links in a crucial way the concepts of force, power and virtue- the 
force in the image and of the image- with the possible or the virtual whose 
going into action has nothing to do with its virtual power- this doesn't 
belong to the logic of the act and acting and that is atstakefor Derrida-. 
lt would have to do with a possible that is in 
potential of being only on the condition of remaining 
possible as possible, and of marking within itself- the scar 
of a wound and the potentialization of force- the 
interruption of this going into action, this enactment, an 
absolute interruption that bears no other seal here than 
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that of death: whence a thought of the virtual work, one 
might also say of a virtual space, of an opus, that would 
accomplish the possible as such without effacing it or even 
enacting it in reality. (1996: 175) 
Derrida suggests that, only in terms of 'mouming', such an action involves 
a thought of death and fulfills the thought of a spectral power of the 
virtual work which is not defined as a category of work or image among 
others as it is the non-essential essence of the work that remains possible 
as such. Marin claims that the being of the image would be its force. Taken 
into account that the greatest force is the renunciation of force then, 
Death, or rather mouming, the mouming of the 
absolute force; that is the name or one of the names, of 
this affect that unites force to the with-out force, thereby 
relating the manifestation of force, as image, to the being 
without- force of that which it manifests or lets be seen, 
right before our very eyes and according to our mouming. 
(Derrida, 1996: 176) 
Derrida in his article posits the question in two ways. Death and 
representation and the representation of death. Having in mind Bronfen's 
assertian in Death and Representation that "the most obvious thing about 
deathis that it is always, only, represented" (1993, 4). 
Here is death, then, there where the image annuls 
i ts representative presence, there where, more precisely, 
the non-productive intensity of the re- of representation 
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gains in power what the present that it represents loses 
presence. (Derrida, 1996: 178) 
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